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NOTES
BURNING THE LIBRARY TO ROAST THE PIG?
ONLINE PORNOGRAPHY AND INTERNET
FILTERING IN THE FREE PUBLIC LIBRARY'

Over the last decade, as public libraries have rushed to
tap the seemingly limitless information available on the
Internet, advocates for child protection have warned of the
perils that face children with unfettered access to the medium.
Because the Internet includes pornography and other content
that could be harmful to children, these advocates call for the
use of Internet filtering software to sanitize the medium,
especially when government funds support the Internet access,
as in public libraries. Civil libertarians and defenders of the
First Amendment, on the other hand, suggest that the
mandatory use of Internet filtering software is a misguided and
ineffective form of censorship' that simultaneously fails to
protect children from the very harms it is intended to prevent,
denies children access to much safe and useful information,
and reduces the Internet content available for adults to that
which would be acceptable for children.!
© 2003 J. Adam Skaggs. All Rights Reserved.
Nancy Willard, an Oregon educator who has written student Internet
safety guides based on self-responsibility, says the use of Internet filters is "nothing
more than stealth censorship." John Schwartz, Internet Filters Block Many Useful
Sites, Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2002, at A28. Barbara Dority, Executive
Director of the Washington Coalition Against Censorship, states the case in her bluntly
titled article Filtering:Just Another Form of Censorship,HUMANIST, Mar./Apr. 1999, at
39, cited in Richard J. Peltz, Use "The Filter You Were Born With". The
Unconstitutionality of Mandatory Internet Filtering for the Adult Patrons of Public
Libraries, 77 WASH. L. REV. 397, 397 (2002).
2 The American Library Association ("ALA") explains that it rejects Internet
filtering in libraries because filters
The ALA also is
block access to information that is legal and useful ....
concerned that the use of filters may give parents a false sense their children
are protected when this is not the case. Filters are not effective in blocking all
.objectionable" material, and they do not protect against pedophiles and other
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Especially in the context of the public library, which
courts have described as a "mighty resource in the free
marketplace of ideas"3 that is "designed for freewheeling
inquiry[,]" 4 free speech advocates suggest that it is
inappropriate to protect youthful innocence by preventing even
adults from accessing any Internet material that might be
unacceptable for children. For those who see Internet filters as
merely the latest attempt to interfere with that bastion of First
Amendment information access,5 the free public library, and its
mission of providing free and unmediated access to
information, "childproofing" the information available in a
public library by sanitizing the Internet is, with apologies to
Justice
Frankfurter, surely burning the library to roast the
6
pig.
The rapid growth of the Internet over the last decade
has made an enormous volume of information available to any
person with access to a networked computer. A 2000 study
estimated that eleven million sites would exist by September,
20017 on the World Wide Web, the most well-traveled segment
of the information superhighway.8 Research suggests that there
interactive aspects of the Internet. . . . Filters do not protect children,
education does.
American Library Association, Libraries, Children and the Internet, at http://www.ala.org/parents/librariesandinternet.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2003), cited in Leah M.
Perkins, Children's Internet ProtectionAct Signed Into Law, LAWYERS J., Feb. 2001, at
2.
Minarcini v. Strongsville City Sch. Dist., 541 F.2d 577, 582-83 (6th Cir.
1976) (citing Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 915 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Describing the free public library, Charles E. Cummings, a historian and
staff member of the Newark Public Library, recently observed (in an unrelated
context), "That's what the library is about, the First Amendment. We are totally a
bastion of free speech." Maria Newman, Poet Laureate Stands By Words Against Israel
and Won't Step Down, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2002, at B8. Professor Richard J. Peltz
describes the public library as "the quintessential venue for citizens to exercise their
First Amendment right to receive information and ideas." Peltz, supra note 1, at 397.
6 See Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957). In Butler, the Supreme
Court evaluated a Michigan statute that made it illegal to make available to the
general public materials that might be harmful to youth, and found that the law
restricted freedom of speech by reducing the material available to the adult population
to only what was fit for children. In writing for the Court, Justice Frankfurter
described the Michigan law as "quarantining the general reading public against books
not too rugged for grown men and women in order to shield juvenile innocence" and
suggested, "[s]urely, this is to burn the house to roast the pig." Id.
7 Am. Library Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401,
419 (E.D.
Pa. 2002).
8 Rolando Jose Santiago, Internet Access in Public
Libraries: A First
Amendment Perspective, 32 URB. LAW. 259, 262 (2000) (explaining that the Internet
includes the World Wide Web, as well as e-mail, automatic mailing list services,
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are in the range of two billion individual pages presently
available on the Web, 9 and thousands of new pages are added
daily."° In evaluating the first Congressional attempt to protect
children from Internet harm,1' the United States Supreme
Court correctly described the Internet as "an international
network of interconnected computers" 2 that "allows users to
search for and retrieve information stored in remote
computers."13
While this ability to access information on computers
throughout the world effectively gives Web users entry into a
great archive of useful information, it also presents significant
risks, as users may encounter a broad range of dangerous,
offensive, indecent and obscene content.14 Estimates suggest
that approximately 100,000 Web sites provide free access to
sexually explicit material, 5 creating significant challenges for
those who seek to protect children from the Web's darker
content while ensuring their access to useful and educational
material. 6 In homes across the country, one can reasonably
expect, parents have devised myriad policies to prevent their
children from accessing inappropriate Web sites. 7 With almost
newsgroups and chat rooms).
9 Am. Library Ass'n, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 2d at 419. See also Peter Lyman &
Hal R. Varian, How Much Information?, at http://www.sims.berkeley.edu/research/projects/how-much-info/internet.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2003) (suggesting that there are
2.5 billion documents on the publicly available Web, or "surface [W]eb," and a total of
550 billion Web-connected documents contained within the "deep" Web, including Webconnected databases, intranet sites and all other "[W]eb-accessible information").
'o American Civil Liberties Union, Cyber Liberties: Censorshipin a Box: Why
Blocking Software is Wrong for Public Libraries(Feb. 13, 2002) at http://www.aclu.org/news/newsprint.cfm?id=9336&c=59 (last visited Jan. 21, 2003), cited in Santiago, supra
note 8, at 263.
" Reno v. ACLU (Reno I), 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (evaluating the
constitutionality of the Communications Decency Act of 1996); see also infra Part II.A.
12 Reno 1, 521 U.S. at 849, cited in Santiago, supra note
8, at 262.
13 Reno 1, 521 U.S. at 852, cited in Santiago, supra note 8, at 262.
14 Sarah E. Warren, Filtering Sexual Material on the Internet: Public
Libraries Surf the Legal Morass, FLA. B.J., Oct. 1999, at 52 ("[Tlhe Internet is ... host
to significant amounts of sexually explicit material-as many as 28,000 hard-and softcore pornography sites." (citing S. REP. No. 105-226, (Internet Filtering Systems)).
'5 Am. Library Ass'n, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 2d at 406. Another study suggests
there are fifteen million Web pages with pornographic content. Angela Xenakis,
Comment, Keeping Children from the Internet's 'Red Light District' Increased
Regulation or Improved Technology?, 3 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 333, 333 (2002) (citing study
by Dr. Steve Lawrence and Dr. Lee Giles, researchers at the NEC Research Institute).
16 A 2000 Study estimated that by 2005, forty-four million children under the
age of eighteen will be using the Internet. Xenakis, supra note 15, at 334 (citing Press
Release, Grunwald Associates, Children, Families and the Internet (June 7, 2000), at
http://www.grunwald.com/survey/newsrelease.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2003)).
17 Parents, of course, are free to control what information their children are
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all schools 8 and libraries 9 now providing children with access
to the Internet, policymakers, teachers and librarians have
struggled to devise policies that serve the same goals as
parental policing.
This Note explores Congressional attempts to protect
children from Internet-based harm, particularly in the public
library setting, without running afoul of the First Amendment.
Many of the issues surrounding Internet filtering in public
libraries mirror concerns about the use of such technology in
school classrooms or school libraries. The unique historical
function of the free public library, however, distinguishes it
from these other educational venues and requires a distinct
analysis of library-based Internet filtering."0
To assess library-based Internet filtering, therefore, this
Note evaluates judicial and scholarly perspectives on Internet
filtering software generally, as well as on the specific nature of
the public library. This evaluation suggests that patrons who
access the Internet in public libraries do so in a designated
public forum for patron-initiated information access and
exchange,' unlike the school setting, where teachers or school
officials control the educational goals of information access. In
such a public forum, the First Amendment prohibits the
government from excluding certain speech based on its
exposed to without violating the First Amendment, unlike public institutions. As Al
Gore has observed, '[bilocking your own child's access to offensive speech is not
censorship-it's parenting." Geoffrey Nunberg, The Internet Filter Farce, AM.
PROSPECT, Jan. 1, 2001, available at http://www.prospect.org/printIV12/1i/nunberg.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2003). That home use of Internet filters by parents is
constitutionally unobjectionable, however, does not insulate library- or school-based
filtering from constitutional attack.
18 In the fall of 2001, 99% of public schools in the U.S. had Internet access,
and Internet access in instructional rooms has grown from 3% in 1994 to 87% in 2001.
National Center for Education Statistics, Internet Access in U.S. Public Schools and
Classrooms: 1994-2001, available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2002/internet/3.asp (last
visited Jan. 20, 2003).
19 A 2000 study found that Internet connectivity in public libraries
was
95.7%, up from 83.6% reported in 1998, and that 94.5% of public libraries provide
public access to the Internet. Press Release, U.S. National Commission on Libraries
and Information Science, 2000 Public Library Internet Study (Sept. 20, 2000), available
at http://www.nclis.gov/news/pressrelease/pr2000/plis2000.html (last visited Jan. 20,
2003).
21 See Kathleen Conn, Protecting Children From Internet Harm (Again): Will
the Children's Internet Protection Act Survive Judicial Scrutiny?, 153 EDUC. L. REP.
469, 481-82 (2001).
21 See Bernard W. Bell, Filth, Filtering, and the First Amendment:
Ruminations on Public Libraries' Use of Internet Filtering Software, 53 FED. COMM.
L.J. 191, 218-26 (2001).
22 Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 915 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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23

disfavored content, unless it uses the most narrowly tailored
means. Presently available Internet filters alone cannot
cleanse the Internet's information resources with the necessary
precision, and, thus, they ultimately censor communications
that are protected by the First Amendment.
Part I of this Note discusses the way in which the
extreme rhetoric employed by both advocates and critics of
Internet filtering has produced a political environment in
which politicians have little incentive to compromise on the
issue. As a result, Congressional leaders have repeatedly
passed legislation that lets them appear "tough" on Internet
smut, but that reviewing courts have held to be
unconstitutional.
To explain why courts have found that these laws
unconstitutionally infringe First Amendment rights, Part II of
this Note will examine judicial responses to Internet filtering
laws, both within and outside the library setting. Part II first
focuses on the Supreme Court's treatment of laws designed to
regulate Internet filth, including those authorizing criminal
penalties for Internet transmission of pornography. The
Supreme Court decisions in Reno v. ACLU,24 ("Reno /')
evaluating the Communications Decency Act of 1996,25 and in

Ashcroft v. ACLU,26 responding to the Child Online Protection
Act of 1998,27 provide an important background, as do lower
court decisions evaluating the nature of the public library as a
public forum, including Kreimer v. Bureau of Police28 and
Mainstream Loudoun v. Board of Trustees.2 Part II then
addresses the constitutionality of the Children's Internet
Protection Act of 2000,0 which conditioned federal library
funds on a recipient library's use of Internet filtering software.
Part III of this Note will suggest that it may be possible
to protect children in a public library setting from Internet
harm without running afoul of the First Amendment, even
while using a system that relies partially on Internet filtering.
2 See Bell, supra note 21, at 203-04.
521 U.S. 844 (1997).

24

25 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)-(3) (1998).
26 122 S.Ct. 1700 (2002).
27

47 U.S.C. § 231(a)-(3).

2 958 F.2d 1242 (3d Cir. 1992).
29Mainstream Loudoun v. Bd. of Trs. (Mainstream Loudoun ), 24 F. Supp.
2d 552 (E.D. Va. 1998); Mainstream Loudoun v. Bd. of Trs. (Mainstream Loudoun 1), 2
F. Supp. 2d 783 (E.D. Va. 1998).
30 47 U.S.C. § 254(h) (2002); 20 U.S.C. § 9134(f).
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In so concluding, this Note proposes alternative solutions to the
dilemma posed to librarians and First Amendment advocates
who value protecting children but resist censorship, a problem
that librarian Jeannette Allis Bastian described as "a question
bedeviling thousands of public librarians who have rushed to
embrace this seemingly limitless and economical information
source only to find that it includes a distinctly dark and dirty
side."3'
I.

INTERNET
FILTERS:
PROTECTING
PROMOTING CENSORSHIP?

A.

The Public Debate over Internet Filtering in Public
Libraries

CHILDREN

OR

Proponents and critics of Internet filtering laws have
cast the debate over such mandates as a battle between civil
libertarians concerned with protecting Americans' First
Amendment freedoms and those who would protect children
from nefarious harm. Strong rhetoric and absolutist language
have characterized public debate over the measures. Critics of
Internet filtering liken the practice to book burning and other
forms of censorship,"2 while filtering advocates warn of the
dangers to children whose minds might be "molested by
cyberpornography. 3 3
Conservative pundits and "family values" advocates
emphasize the ubiquity of online pornography and the
menacing danger it poses to American children." Before the
Supreme Court, Solicitor General Theodore Olson recently
emphasized the "substantial, incalculable damage to our
children"35 caused by Internet pornography. As Janet LaRue,
senior director of legal studies with the conservative Family
Research Council, has argued, "[because of the policies of the
31

32

Warren, supra note 14, at 53.
See, e.g., Joan E. Bertin, A Necessary Evil?, CENSORSHIP NEWS ONLINE, at

http://www.ncac.org/cen-news/cn77views.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2002).
33 id
.

That substantial segments of the nation fear the online smut menace is
reflected by the growth of the Internet filtering industry. A 2001 report estimated that
the content filtering industry exceeded $150 million a year and would reach $1.3 billion
by 2003. Nunberg, supra note 17.
35 Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, Ashcroft
v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002)
(No. 00-1293) (defending COPA); see also Linda Greenhouse, Justices Revisit the Issue
of Child Protection in the Age of Internet Pornography,N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2001, at
34

A28.
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American Librarian Association [opposing filtering in
libraries], public libraries with unrestricted Internet access are
virtual peep shows open to kids and funded by taxpayers .... '
Conservative radio talk show host Dr. Laura Schlessinger "has
called on her daily listeners to picket libraries that supply
children with pornography."3 7
With equally sweeping rhetoric, opponents of Internet
filtering compare it to the most despicable forms of censorship,
and claim filtering strikes at the very heart of American
democracy. Judith Krug, director of the Office for Intellectual
Freedom of the American Library Association ("ALA"), has
criticized Internet filtering laws. Krug maintains that, "[alny
legislative endeavor that seeks to restrict the information that
is available to the citizens of the United States strikes at the
heart of our Constitution. . . . Without information that is
readily available and accessible, we cannot govern ourselves
effectively. We cannot govern ourselves period."" The ALA
spotlights the central role played by the public library in
fostering the informational exchange required in a selfgoverning society, proclaiming that "free access to the books,
ideas, resources, and information in America's libraries is

36

Jean Hellwege, Civil Liberties, Library Groups Challenge the Latest Law

Restricting Web Access, 37 TRIAL 93 (2001).
37 Junichi P. Semitsu, Burning Cyberbooks in Public
Libraries: Internet
Filtering Software vs. the First Amendment, 52 STAN. L. REv. 509, 511 (citing The

Official Dr. Laura Web site, at http://www.drlaura.com (last visited Oct. 29, 2001)). As
Semitsu notes, some of Dr. Schlessinger's objections to unfiltered Internet access may
stem from the fact that "some of the pornographic images available on the Internet
happen to be nude photos of Dr. Laura herself that were taken by an ex-lover and sold
to an X-rated website." Id. at 511-12.
Hellwege, supra note 36, at 93. Janet Axelrod, a Trustee of the Cambridge,
Massachusetts Public Library, puts it more succinctly: "Libraries are about preserving
democracy.
Nothing less." Libraries
for the Future Web site, at
http://www.lff.org/about/contact.html. The ALA's Krug has emphasized that "[tihe
importance of the First Amendment ... is that it provides us with the ability to govern
ourselves, because it guarantees that you have the right to access information. The
filters undercut that ability." Schwartz, supra note 1. Advocates like Krug root their
objections to Internet filtering in the First Amendment's proscriptions against
government censorship. In so doing, they tap into a long tradition of opposition to
censorship that traces back to the Framers. As James Madison observed near the end
of his life, "A popular Government, without popular information, or the means of
acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both. Knowledge
will forever govern ignorance: And a people who mean to be their own Governors, must
arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives." THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER:
SOURCES OF THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JAMES MADISON 437 (Marvin Meyers ed.,

1973).
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imperative for education, employment, enjoyment, and selfgovernment."39
The ALA has adopted a position of unequivocal
opposition to government censorship in its "Resolution on
Opposition to Federally Mandated Internet Filtering,"" that
provides in part:
Whereas, The American Library Association has as its cornerstone
the First Amendment and free and open access to the information
people need and want regardless of the format in which that
information appears; and
Whereas, Millions of our nation's library users cannot afford
computers ... and therefore rely on public access computers in their
local libraries for Internet access; and ...
Whereas, The ALA strongly believes that educating children to use
the Internet wisely provides children their best protection, now and
in the future; and...
Whereas, The ALA does not endorse blocking or filtering Internet
content in libraries because there is no proven technology that both
blocks out all illegal content and allows access to all constitutionally
protected material...
Resolved, That ALA will initiate litigation against [federally
mandated filtering laws] to ensure that the people of America have
41
unfettered access to information ....

Groups like the American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") join
the ALA in its objections to federally mandated Internet
filtering. The ACLU has united with the ALA to file suits
against successive congressional attempts to sanitize the
content of the Internet.42
Litigation inspired by Internet filtering policies has not
been limited to suits against federally mandated filtering, such
39 American Library Association, Libraries:An American Value, available
at
http://www.ala.org/alaorg/oif/lib-val.html (last visited Dec. 31, 2002). Krug emphasizes
that "Free people read freely .... We must work to preserve this basic American right
and ensure access to the broadest range of information." Press Release, American
Library Association, ALA Raises Red Flag on Recent Bush Executive Order (Mar. 1,
2002), available at http://wwv.ala.org/news/v8n3/executiveorder.html (last visited Jan.
20, 2003).
'0 American Library Association, Resolution on Opposition to Federally
Mandated Internet Filtering,availableat http://www.ala.org/alaorg/oif/mandatedfiltering.pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 2002).
41

id.

See, e.g., Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Promises
Legal Challenge as Congress Adopts Bill Imposing Internet Blocking in Libraries, at
http://www.aclu.org/news/2000/nl21800a.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2002).
42
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as those initiated by the ALA and the ACLU. Individuals have
also filed suits against libraries that adopted filtering policies
independent of congressional mandates. Library patrons have
sued libraries that installed protective Internet filtering
software on their own initiative, alleging that mandatory
filtering abridges their First Amendment rights to access
information." Suits are not limited to those challenging
libraries that filter Internet content, however; libraries that
have chosen not to filter have also found themselves accused in
court." In a noteworthy California case, a mother whose son
had downloaded an extensive portfolio of pornography at the
local library sued the library, seeking to bar public officials
from spending public funds on library computers from which
minors could access sexually explicit material.45
Given the heated rhetoric and passionate advocacy
surrounding the issue of Internet filtering, librarians are faced
with the daunting decision of whether to adopt policies that
require Internet filtering software. Professional librarians
across the country have come to different conclusions, with
some library systems adopting Internet use policies requiring
universal filtering, and other systems refusing to install filters
on any computers. 6
B.

CongressionalResponses to the Dangers of Internet
Pornography

If librarians have differed in opinion over the wisdom of
using Internet filters, congressional responses to dangerous
Internet speech have more uniformly reflected the influence of

See, e.g., Mainstream Loudoun II, 24 F. Supp. 2d 552 (E.D. Va. 1998).
As a result, libraries deciding whether or not to filter may be facing a
"damned if you do, damned if you don't" position. Kathleen R. v. City of Livermore, 104
Cal. Rptr. 2d 772, 776 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001), cited in Peltz, supra note 1, at 399.
41 See Semitsu, supra note 37, at 522 (citing Pamela Mendels, Family
Sues
Library for Not Restricting Children's Internet Access, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1998, at
http://www.nytimes.conilibrary/tech/98/06/cyber/articles/14library.html
(last visited
Jan. 17, 2003)). See also Warren, supra note 14, at 56 (citing Kathleen R. v. City of
Livermore, No. V-015266-4, slip op. (E.D. Cal. May 28, 1998)).
Less than 17% of those libraries with public Internet access use filters in
some capacity, while less than 7% of those libraries with public Internet access use
filters on all computer terminals. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Am.
Library Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, No. 01-CV-1301, para. 56 (E.D. Pa. 2001),
available at http://www.ala.org/cipa/cipacomplaint.pdf (last visited January 30, 2003),
cited in Peltz, supra note 1, at 433, n.256, 257; see also TIFAP: The Internet Filter
Assessment Project, at http://www.bluehighways.com/tifap (last visited Jan. 17, 2002).
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pro-filtering groups like the Family Research Council.47
Legislators face substantial political pressure to ensure that no
public funds allow access to pornography through libraries, and
"[tihe pro-filtering side is much stronger in legislative bodies.
Very few representatives have voted against or publicly
opposed ... the various filtering bills."48 Congressional efforts,
led by former Senator Dan Coats and Senators John McCain
and Rick Santorum, among others, have resulted in the
adoption of several laws over the past seven years, each of
which takes a slightly different approach to harmful Internet
material.
With the Communications Decency Act ("CDA") in
9
1996," Congress imposed criminal penalties on those who
knowingly transmitted obscene or indecent materials to
children under the age of eighteen. ° The Child Online
Protection Act ("COPA"), passed in 1998,' imposed criminal
penalties as well as civil sanctions on those who published Web
sites that were harmful to minors.5 2 Most recently, the
Children's Internet Protection Act ("CIPA") of 2000" banned
the use of certain federal funds by public schools and libraries
that refused to install Internet filters on all computers.5 4
Though congressional supporters of these laws have
defended them as necessary to combat the dangers new
technology poses to children, 5 judicial responses to date reflect
41 See, e.g., Congress Weighing Internet Filteringfor Schools, Libraries,CNN,
Oct. 15, 2000, at http://www.cnn.com/2000/TECH/computing/10/15/internetfiltering.ap/
(last visited Jan. 17, 2003). According to John Albaugh, chief of staff for Representative
Ernest Istook, "This is insuring that the government is not paying for access to
pornography through libraries .... We have received tremendous support from the
public on this. It just seems like it's a no-brainer to the average Joe." Id.
48 Filtering Software Debate Continues, TECH L.J. (Dec. 21, 1998), at
http://www.techlawjournal.com/censor/19981221.htm (last visited Jan. 17, 2002).
49 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)-(e)
(1998).

'o See infra Part II.A.

47 U.S.C. § 231(a)-(3).
See infra Part II.A.
53 47 U.S.C. § 254(h) (2002).
14 See infra Part
II.C.
55 Representative Bob Franks,
an initial sponsor of CIPA in the House,
explained the rationale for laws designed to protect children from Internet harm.
Within seconds, our children can find up-to-date information on every
conceivable subject they are studying in school. But this extraordinarily
powerful learning tool can also have a dark and threatening side . . .The
reality is that materials breeding hate, violence, pornography and even
personal danger can be waiting only a few "clicks" away.
Supporters of Internet Filtering in Schools and Libraries Back Franks-McCain Bill,
TECH. L.J. (March 3, 1999), at http://www.techlawjournal.com/censor/19990303.htm
51
52
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several of the points advanced by civil libertarians.56 The cool
judicial reception to laws aimed at online pornography stems
from the conclusion that, even if intended solely to protect
children, the laws are drafted in unacceptably broad terms that
result in the censorship of constitutionally protected speech
among adults.
The
Supreme
Court
held
that
the
CDA
unconstitutionally burdened protected speech in the 1997 case
of Reno v. ACLU. 57 Though the Supreme Court has not yet
definitively assessed COPA's constitutionality,"8 several
Justices have raised questions about the Act 59 and have

suggested they may ultimately find it runs afoul of the First
Amendment." Finally, the Supreme Court will decide a
constitutional challenge to CIPA for the first time this term,61
after the District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania held CIPA unconstitutional62 and enjoined the
government from enforcing it.6" Because both COPA and CIPA
suffer overbreadth defects similar to those that made the CDA
unconstitutional, it is likely both will ultimately be struck
down as unconstitutional. As a result, while congressional
(last visited Jan. 17, 2003).
56 See, e.g., FilteringSoftware Debate Continues, supra note 48. ("[Tlhe antifiltering side has much more support in the judicial branch. Judges do not stand for reelection, or face voter wrath. Moreover, the judicial branch has a long tradition of
protecting many forms of reprehensible speech . . .
57 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
5' See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 122 S.Ct. 1700 (2002) (remanding challenge to
COPA to the Third Circuit for clarification of various issues).
59 Linda Greenhouse, Justices to Review Internet Pornography Filters, N.Y.

TIMES, Nov. 13, 2002, at A24.
See, e.g., Ashcroft, 122 S.Ct. 1716 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that
there is "a real likelihood" that COPA is "overbroad and cannot survive" a
constitutional challenge since "content-based regulations like [COPA] are
presumptively invalid abridgments of the freedom of speech").
61 The Supreme Court has agreed to hear the challenge to CIPA in its current
term. See Greenhouse, supra note 59.
12 Am. Library Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 419
(E.D.
Pa. 2002). The District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania heard the case
on March 25, 2002. Plaintiffs in the suit included libraries, library users, state library
associations and the Freedom to Read Foundation. Both the ALA and the ACLU filed
similar challenges, and the two cases were consolidated by the court and heard
together. See American Library Association, CIPA Court Date Pushed Back to March
25, at http://www.ala.org/news/v7nl4/cipare.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2003).
Predictably, filtering opponents embraced the decision enthusiastically.
The ALA's Judith Krug announced "I am ecstatic .... We couldn't have wanted
anything better." Ann Beeson, litigation director of the ACLU's technology and liberty
program, proclaimed "The court has barred the law from turning librarians into
thought police armed with clumsy filters . . . ." John Schwartz, Court Blocks Law that
Limits Access to Web in Library, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2002, at Al.
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leaders have seized the political high ground of protecting
children from Internet dangers, in the end, they will have
accomplished little, passing a series of unconstitutional
measures.
In spite of the worthwhile intention of protecting
children from harmful Internet material, a goal "devoutly to be
wished,"64 Congress will be able to achieve this goal in the
library context only by refining its approach and narrowing the
filtering mandates of CIPA to reflect the First Amendment
principles articulated by the Supreme Court.65 Political leaders
may not see a political advantage in "compromising" on issues
relating to children and Internet pornography,66 instead seeing
an opportunity for political gain in attacking opponents-and
the courts-for being "soft" on Internet smut.6 7 However, unless
congressional leaders move beyond their attempts to gain
political capital by passing "tough"-but unconstitutionallaws, they will fail to control the content children may access
on library computers. Only by significantly narrowing their
approach will congressional backers of filtering laws
successfully mandate the use of Internet filtering software on
public library computers used by children without running
afoul of the First Amendment.
II.

A.

JUDICIAL RESPONSES TO REGULATION OF THE INTERNET
AND PUBLIC LIBRARIES

The Supreme Court's Considerationof the CDA and
COPA

In order to assess the possibility of constitutionally
mandating the use of Internet filtering software in public
libraries, it is necessary to examine the judicial responses both
rA
6

Am. Library Ass'n, Inc., 201 F. Supp 2d at 410.
See infra Part III.

66 See Adam Goldstein, Note, Like a Sieve: The Child Internet ProtectionAct
and Ineffective Filters in Libraries, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

1187, 1190-94, 1201-02 (2002) (explaining that, in adopting CIPA, Congress included
filtering measures in spite of recommendations by a congressional child safety
committee that specifically rejected the use of filters, and suggesting that legislators
may have been moved to do so, in part, by polls showing significant public support for
library Internet filtering).
67

Senate Holds Hearing on Internet Indecency, TECH L.J., Feb. 10, 1998, at

http://www.techlawjournal.com/censor/80210cda.htm
(last visited Nov. 3, 2002)
(quoting Senator Dan Coats's attacks on the Supreme Court for choosing "to put the
rights of pornographers ahead of the welfare of children" and on the Clinton
administration for being soft on Internet indecency).
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to regulation of speech on the Internet generally, as well as to
the role of the public library as a forum for communication.
Such an examination begins with an analysis of the Supreme
Court's reaction to the CDA in Reno v. ACLU,68 and to COPA,
in Ashcroft v. ACLU.6"
In early 1996, President Clinton signed into law the
first congressional attempt to protect children from offensive
Internet materials, the Communications Decency Act, as part
of the more comprehensive Telecommunications Act of 1996.70
The CDA criminalized the use of a "telecommunications device"
to knowingly transmit "obscene" or "indecent" communications
to children under the age of eighteen.7 ' In addition, the Act
made unlawful the communication of "patently offensive"
sexually explicit material to minors through any Internet
means, including e-mail, listservs, newsgroups and chat
72
rooms.
The ACLU swiftly challenged the CDA, requesting an
injunction against enforcement of the Act in the District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.7 3 The ACLU claimed,
inter alia, that the Act was unconstitutional because it was
vague and overbroad, failed to adequately define what
materials were "indecent" or "patently offensive" and failed to
require the use of the least restrictive means of achieving a
compelling government objective.74 Judge Ronald L. Buckwalter
granted a temporary restraining order enjoining enforcement of
the Act,7 ' and a three-judge panel subsequently granted a
preliminary injunction against enforcement. 6 The Government
then filed a direct appeal to the Supreme Court, which granted
certiorari in late 1996. 77
Following the lower court's logic," the Supreme Court
struck down the CDA in Reno. 79 Writing for a 7-2 majority of

70

521 U.S. 844 (1997).
535 U.S. 564 (2002).
Steven C. Jacques, Comment, Reno v. ACLU: Insulating the Internet, The

FirstAmendment, and the Marketplaceof Ideas, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1945, 1970 (1997).
71 Id.
at 1972-73.
72 Conn, supra note 20, at 471-72.
73 Jacques, supra note 70, at 1974 (citing ACLU v. Reno, No. Civ. A. 96-963,
1996 WL 65464, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 15, 1996)).
7
Id. at 1974-75. (citing ACLU v. Reno, No. Civ. A. 96-963, 1996 WL 65464,
at *1 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 15, 1996)).
7, Id. (citing ACLU v. Reno, No. Civ. A. 96-963, 1996 WL 65464, at *4).
76 Id.
at 1978 (citing ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 857 (E.D. Pa. 1996)).
77 See Reno I, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
78 See Jacques, supra note 70, at 1978.
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the Court, Justice Stevens explained first that the Act was
unconstitutionally vague, since ambiguities in language
rendered the Act "problematic for purposes of the First
Amendment."8 ° Justice Stevens noted that the Act included
language criminalizing both "indecent" and "patently offensive"
material and concluded that "[g]iven the absence of a definition
of either term, this difference in language will provoke
uncertainty among speakers about how the two standards
relate to each other and just what they mean."8 The Court
deemed the CDA unconstitutionally vague because of its
ambiguities and imprecise language. 2
Perhaps more significantly, the Court concluded that
the CDA was unconstitutional because, as written, it was
overbroad. Stating that "the CDA lacks the precision that the
First Amendment requires when a statute regulates the
content of speech,"83 Stevens explained that in order "to deny
minors access to potentially harmful speech, the CDA
effectively suppresses a large amount of speech that adults
have a constitutional right to receive . . .

."'

Stevens went on to

state that the "breadth of the CDA's coverage [was] wholly
unprecedented [,] " r and that the "breadth of this content-based

restriction of speech imposes an especially heavy burden on the
Government to explain why a less restrictive provision would
not be as effective as the CDA. It has not done so."86
In holding the CDA to a "least restrictive alternative"
analysis, Stevens explained that strict scrutiny of the CDA was
appropriate both because the statute imposed criminal
sanctions and because it was a content-based restriction on
speech.87 Because the criminal penalties of the CDA would lead
to an unacceptable "burden on adult speech,"' the Court found
the Act overbroad, even while acknowledging the government's
79

See Reno I, 521 U.S. 844.

80 Id. at

870.

81 Id. at 871.
' Id. at 874.
3

Id.

Reno I, 521 U.S. at 874.
Id. at 877.
86 Id.
at 879.
87 Id.
at 871-72. See generally Brigette L. Nowak, The First Amendment
Implications of Placing Blocking Software on Public Library Computers, 45 WAYNE L.
REV. 327, 335-37 (1999) ("Content-based restrictions on speech are subject to strict
scrutiny. Thus, the regulation must serve a compelling state interest and be narrowly
drawn to achieve that goal.").
Reno 1,521 U.S. at 874.
5
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interest in protecting children from harmful materials. 9
Advancing this admittedly compelling interest, however, would
require a narrower approach than that taken by the CDA, since
"the Government may not 'reduc[e] the adult population.., to
... only what is fit for children."'9 ° To do so would be to limit
adult communications by way of what has been described as
the "sandbox" effect.9 The Supreme Court conclusively held
that the sanitization of adult speech through the "sandbox"
effect imposed an impermissible burden on adults' First
Amendment rights.
After the Supreme Court struck down the CDA,
Congress attempted to "refine its approach"92 in light of the
Court's decision in Reno v. ACLU,passing the Child Online
Protection Act in 1998. 9' Like the CDA, COPA mandated
criminal sanctions for the transmission of communications that
are "harmful to minors." 4 COPA also provided civil penalties
for such transmissions." Although COPA specified a broader
range of penalties than the CDA, it had a more narrow reach,
applying only to materials communicated on commercial sites
on the World Wide Web96 and calling for evaluation of material
deemed "harmful to minors" under the Ginsberg test.97
Congress, in drafting COPA, measured what speech
could be considered "harmful to minors" under Supreme Court
tests, and aimed to insulate the laws by adhering to Supreme
Court precedent, which had recognized a compelling state
interest in protecting children." The leading precedent,
Id. at 875.
(citing Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518
U.S. 727, 759 (1996) (internal citations omitted)).
91 Id. (citing Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 74-75 (1983)
(holding that, with respect to regulating the mailing of adult materials, "regardless of
the strength of the government's interest" in protecting children, "[tihe level of
discourse reaching a mailbox simply cannot be limited to that which would be suitable
for a sandbox.")). See Santiago, supra note 8,at 267.
92 Conn, supra note 20, at 471 (citing JOHN MCCAIN, COMMERCIAL
DISTRIBUTION OF MATERIAL HARMFUL TO MINORS ON THE WORLD WIDE WEB, S. REP.
NO. 105-225, at 5 (1998)).
93 47 U.S.C. § 231(a)-(e) (1998).
Id. § 231(a)(1).
95 See Conn, supra note 20, at 471-72.
9 Id.
97 See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (upholding a New
York
statute prohibiting sale of obscene material to minors under the age of seventeen, even
if not obscene by adult standards). See also Conn, supra note 20.
98 See Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727
(1996); Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989); Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 629.
89

90 Id.
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Ginsberg v. New York, involved a storeowner charged with
violating the New York Penal Code for selling "girlie"
magazines to a sixteen-year-old boy.99 In upholding the statute
in question, the Ginsberg Court found that a state may
"regulate the sale of material that is 'harmful to minors' under
the age of seventeen if such material (1) predominantly appeals
to the prurient, shameful, or morbid interest of minors, (2) is
patently offensive to prevailing standards, and (3) is utterly
without redeeming social importance to minors.""' The Court
further refined this test in Miller v. California,' in which the
Court clarified that the trier of fact should measure prevailing
standards by asking whether "the average person, applying
contemporary community standards ,0 2 would find the
communications obscene.
Soon after COPA's passage, the ACLU and other
challengers of the CDA proceeded to follow their previously
successful script, seeking injunctive relief once more in the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 01 As it did when confronted
by the CDA, the district court issued an injunction against
COPA's enforcement.' 4 The Third Circuit then affirmed the
injunction.'' On May 21, 2001, the Supreme Court agreed to
hear the case.0 6 The Court heard arguments on November 28,
2001,107 and decided Ashcroft v. ACLU on May 13, 2002.08
In the district court, the plaintiffs advanced their facial
challenge to COPA by alleging several constitutional
infirmities, all relating to their fear that they could be
prosecuted under COPA for publishing Web sites with material
that, while valuable for adults, could be construed as harmful
1 They
to minors in some communities. 09
alleged that COPA
violated adults' First Amendment rights "because it (1)
Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 631, discussed in Kimberly S. Keller, Comment,
From Little Acorns Great Oaks Grow: The Constitutionalityof ProtectingMinors from
Harmful Internet Material in Public Libraries,.30 ST. MARY'S L.J. 549, 579 (1999).
100 Conn, supra note 20, at 472 (citing Ginsberg,390 U.S. at 645-47).
101 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
102 Id.
at 24.
103 ACLU v. Reno (Reno II), 31 F. Supp. 2d 473 (E.D. Pa. 1999). See also Liza
Kessler & Gregory G. Rapawy, Cyberspeech and the FirstAmendment: Can Community
Standards be Determined on the Internet?, 2 ANN. 2000 ATLA-CLE 1605 (2000).
104 Reno 11, 31 F. Supp.
2d 473, 477.
105 ACLU v. Reno (Reno III), 217 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2000).
"6 Ashcroft v. ACLU, 532 U.S. 1037 (2001) (granting review).
107 Ashcroft v. ACLU, 122 S.Ct. 1700 (2002).
108Id.
1o9 Id. at 1706.
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create[d] an effective ban on constitutionally protected speech
by and to adults; (2) was not the least restrictive means of
accomplishing any compelling governmental purpose; and (3)
[was] substantially overbroad.""' In granting an injunction
barring government enforcement of COPA, the district court
concluded that because COPA involved a content-based
regulation of speech protected by the First Amendment, it was
"presumptively invalid" and "subject to strict scrutiny. " 111 The
court suggested that COPA would likely fail strict scrutiny
analysis because it did not appear to be the least restrictive
means of protecting children."'
On appeal, while the Third Circuit affirmed, it based its
decision on a narrow ground that "was not relied upon below
and that was 'virtually ignored by the parties and the amicus
in their respective briefs.''
The court of appeals held that
COPA was substantially overbroad because it used
"contemporary community standards to identify material that
[was] harmful to minors . . ."" The court noted that "because
of the peculiar geography-free nature of cyberspace, a
'community standards' test would essentially require every
Web communication to abide by the most restrictive
community's standards, " "'
allowing decisions on the
appropriateness of communications to be made for the nation
by "the most puritan of communities."1"' Thus, according to the
Third Circuit, COPA remained flawed as a result of a
"puritanical community" principle similar to the "sandbox"
effect, where communications among adults were limited to
what was acceptable to the most easily offended.
The Third Circuit distinguished the COPA case from
precedents in which the Supreme Court approved subjecting
the same conduct to varying community standards," 7 arguing
that unlike phone-sex operators, who could effectively restrict
their services to certain geographic communities, Web
publishers have "no such comparable control. Web publishers
110 Id. (internal citations omitted).
111 Id. (internal citations omitted).
112 Ashcroft, 122 S. Ct. at 1706.

115

Id. (citing Reno III, 217 F.3d 162, 173-74 (3d Cir. 2000)).
Id.
Reno III, 217 F.3d at 175.

116

Id.

114

117 See, e.g., Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 125-26
(1989)

(holding that company providing obscene material in "dial-a-porn" service bears burden
of complying with obscenity definitions of each respective community).
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cannot restrict access to their site based on the geographic
1 i The court noted
locale of the Internet user visiting their site.""
that Web publishers of material that might be deemed
"harmful to minors" must "comply with the regulation imposed
by the [community] with the most stringent standard or
[entirely] forego Internet communication of [their] message." 119
Before the Supreme Court, Solicitor General Theodore
Olson argued for the government that the Third Circuit had
misinterpreted COPA. Rejecting the contention that the use of
a "contemporary community standard" in COPA would limit
speech to that acceptable to a "puritanical community," Olson
argued that the government could accept a single, national
"contemporary community standard," since, in adopting COPA,
"Congress felt . . . there would not be substantial variation
between what the average adult would feel would be harmful to
minors.""' The Court addressed the narrow issue of whether
the use of a single, national community standard rendered
COPA unconstitutional, but did not address the range of
overbreadth concerns the district court considered below.
In a fractured decision that featured four separate
rationales, 2 ' the Court vacated the Third Circuit's judgment
and remanded the case for clarification of several issues the
Third Circuit had found it unnecessary to reach. Justice
Thomas's plurality opinion, joined only by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, stated that "COPA's reliance on
community standards to identify 'material that is harmful to
minors' does not by itself render the statute substantially

11
119

Reno III, 217 F.3d at 176.
Id. (quoting Am. Libraries Ass'n, Inc. v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 182-83

(S.D.N.Y. 1997)).
120 Ashcroft v. ACLU, No 00-1293, oral arguments, Nov. 28, 2001, at 8; see
also Greenhouse, supra note 35. COPA's congressional defenders supported this
interpretation of "community standards." A brief submitted to the Court by Senator
John McCain and retired Representative Thomas Bliley argued that
What is harmful to minors isn't decided by a geographical community.
Instead it is based on the views of the American adult community as a whole.
The law was to be adapted to the World Wide Web by using a new standard
of what the American adult-age community as a whole would find prurient
and offensive to minors.
Xenakis, supra note 15, at 339 (citing Scott Ritter, Court Weighs Shielding Children
from Web Smut, WALL ST. J., Nov. 26, 2001, at B14).
121 See Linda Greenhouse, Justices Give Reprieve to
an Internet Pornography
Statute, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2002, at A17 (describing Ashcroft v. ACLU as "a fractured
decision . . . [that was] as messy a product as the court has brought forth in several
years").
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overbroad for purposes of the First Amendment." 122 A majority
of the Justices agreed that the case should be remanded for
clarification of various issues, but their reasoning varied.
Justices O'Connor and Breyer authored opinions suggesting
that a single national standard, rather than a range of separate
community standards, should be used in applying COPA, while
Justice Kennedy argued that several remaining issues needed
to be clarified by the lower courts before the Supreme Court
could definitively judge whether COPA passed constitutional
muster. Only Justice Stevens suggested that the Third
Circuit's decision should be affirmed.
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Souter and
Ginsburg, wrote that there was "a very real likelihood that
123
[COPA] is overbroad and cannot survive" strict scrutiny.
Kennedy suggested that even if a national community standard
were used, there would be some variation in its application in
different communities. According to Kennedy, this "national
variation in community standards constitutes a particular
burden on Internet speech."124 Because the Third Circuit
decided the case on a particularly narrow ground without
considering how to construe various aspects of COPA, however,
Kennedy wrote that the Supreme Court could not definitively
assess its constitutionality. Too many questions of correct
interpretation remained unresolved, according to Kennedy,
who insisted that the court of appeals undertake a
"comprehensive analysis" 1 2 of COPA before the Supreme Court
could make any final assessment. While Kennedy concurred in
the decision to remand for clarification to the Third Circuit, he
did so while suggesting that, because the law placed "a
substantial burden on Internet communication," there were
"grave doubts that COPA is consistent with the First
216
Amendment."
While the discord among the Justices in Ashcroft
suggests that they are far from unanimity in evaluating
COPA's constitutionality, they likely will strike down the Act
when it eventually returns to the Court. Commentators have
suggested that Justice Kennedy's cautious opinion lies closer to

122

Ashcroft, 122 S. Ct. at 1713.

123

Id. at 1716 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

124 Id. at 1720.
125

126

Id.
Id. at 1722.
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the Court's "center of gravity"127 and that a majority may
eventually find COPA insufficiently narrow to survive strict
scrutiny. Though the final outcome is impossible to predict
with certainty, it appears probable that the Supreme Court will
find COPA, like the CDA, overbroad and unconstitutional for
placing an impermissible burden on constitutionally protected
communications between adults.
B.

FirstAmendment Information Rights in the Public
Library

The decisions of the Supreme Court striking down the
CDA and suggesting that COPA will eventually be found
unconstitutional establish important principles that impact the
possibility of regulating the Internet in the broadest context. In
assessing the constitutionality of Internet filtering regulation
in the narrower context of the free public library, however, it is
necessary to examine judicial perspectives on the library itself,
which courts have characterized as the "quintessential locus of
the receipt of information."'28 In order to see how courts have
evaluated restrictions on speech in this unique venue, it is first
necessary to distinguish the government's power to control the
content of its own speech from its ability to regulate the
content of communications that take place within a
government-funded forum. In applying this distinction to
public libraries, the insights provided by Kreimer v. Bureau of
Police12 and Mainstream Loudoun v. Board of Trustees ° help
clarify the library's status as a government-funded forum.
i.The First Amendment Right to Access Information
and Ideas
The Supreme Court has clearly distinguished situations
in which the government acts as a speaker from those in which
the government acts as a facilitator of communications between
12' Greenhouse, supra note 121 (explaining that COPA "barely
survived an
initial Supreme Court test ... in a fractured decision suggesting that the court may
ultimately find the law unconstitutional."); see also David L. Hudson, Jr., Online Porn
Law Gets Another Chance, ABA J. E-REPORT, May 17, 2002, available at
http://www.abanet.org/journal/ereport/ml7copa.html
(last visited Oct. 12, 2002)
(suggesting that while "The U.S. Supreme Court has resuscitated" COPA, "the law still
appears to be on life support").
"8 Kreimer v. Bureau of Police, 958 F.2d 1242, 1255 (3d Cir. 1992).
129958 F.2d 1242 (3d Cir. 1992).
130 24 F. Supp. 2d 552 (E.D. Va. 1998).
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private speakers. When the government expends funds to
promote a specific message, it may dictate to the recipient of
those funds specific guidelines about what speech the funding
may or may not underwrite.'31 In these situations, the
government effectively deputizes the grantee to transmit the
government's own message, and therefore has a clear interest
in ensuring the content and accuracy of that message.
Accordingly, "[w]hen the government disburses public funds...
to convey a government message, it may take legitimate and
appropriate steps to ensure that its message is neither garbled
'
When the government
nor distorted by the grantee." 32
underwrites the communication of a specific message,
government itself is effectively the speaker, and its power to
control the content of its own speech is substantial.
Conversely, when the government expends money not to
speak itself, but rather to facilitate communications among
private actors, the state's power to restrict the content of that
speech is far more limited. The Supreme Court has recognized
this category of government spending programs, which are
"designed to facilitate private speech, not to promote a
governmental message."'33 The Court explained the logic behind
this distinction in Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the
University of Virginia, which concerned the university's
decision to fund certain student newspapers while refusing to
fund newspapers that advocated a religious viewpoint.' The
Court held that the university, a state actor, had a legitimate
interest in determining the content of its own speech, but not
that of student groups whose speech it helped facilitate.
When the University determines the content of the education it
provides, it is the University speaking, and we have permitted the
government to regulate the content of what is or is not expressed
when it is the speaker or when it enlists private entities to convey its
that viewpointown message . .. It does not follow, however ....
,3, See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991). In Rust, the Supreme Court
found that funds appropriated by Congress for a family planning program may
properly be conditioned upon a recipient's agreement not to counsel patients regarding
abortion. Explaining the logic of the decision by analogy, the Court noted that "[wihen
Congress established a National Endowment for Democracy to encourage other
countries to adopt democratic principles ... it was not constitutionally required to fund
a program to encourage competing lines of political philosophy such as communism and
fascism." Id. at 194.
132 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 833
(1995).
, Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 542 (2001).
134 Rosenberger,515 U.S. at 820.
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based restrictions are proper when the University does not itself
speak or subsidize transmittal of a message it favors but instead
expends funds to encourage a diversity of views from private
1 35

speakers.

As the Court concluded in Rosenberger, when the government
spends money to facilitate communication among and between
members of the public, its power to exclude certain messages
based on their content or viewpoint is significantly
circumscribed.
The First Amendment's limitations on government's
power to restrict the content of private speech give private
actors a freedom to speak, and a right to receive
communications free from governmental censorship, since "the
right to receive ideas follows ineluctably from the sender's First
Amendment right to send them."'36 In granting freedom both to
transmit and to receive information, the First Amendment
"afford[s] the public access to discussion, debate, and the
dissemination of information and ideas."'37 In evaluating the
constitutionality of a public library's rules of patron conduct,
the oft-cited Kreimer'35 decision shed light on the power of the
state to restrict the public's access to information and ideas
within the public library context.
ii. Kreimer and Information Freedom in the Public
Library
When library officials repeatedly ejected a homeless
man, Richard Kreimer, from the Morristown Public Library in
New Jersey, he sued the library,'39 challenging the
constitutionality of the policies that had authorized his
removal.'40 The Third Circuit upheld the library's policies,
noting with approval the district court's characterization of
them as content-neutral rules of patron conduct designed to
3'

Id. at 833-34 (internal citations omitted).
457 U.S. 853, 867-68 (1982). See generally Keller,

36 Bd. of Educ. v. Pico,

supra note 99, at 573-77 (analyzing the right to receive speech and the implications of
factors, including age, on the individual's right to receive certain communications).
137 First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435
U.S. 765, 783 (1978).
138 Kreimer v. Bureau of Police, 958 F.2d 1242 (3d Cir. 1992).
139

Id. at 1246.

No stranger to litigation, Kreimer has filed claims against Woodbury, New
Jersey claiming that a loitering ban was unconstitutional, as well as against the New
Jersey Attorney General's office and prosecution and election offices in Morris County
for denying him access to files about him. Joseph P. Fried, More Legal Battles for a
Lawsuit Veteran, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2002, § 1, at 37.
140
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ensure "a quiet and orderly atmosphere ... conducive to every
patron's exercise of their constitutionally protected interest in
receiving and reading written communications."14 ' Inherent in
the court's reasoning was the acknowledgement that the First
Amendment encompasses not only the right to speak but to
receive speech.'42 In recognizing this right of public access to
information and ideas within the public library, the Kreimer
court also characterized the public library as a "limited public
forum" for purposes of First Amendment analysis.'
The Kreimer court reviewed several Supreme Court
cases in determining that the First Amendment's application
within
context
of the public library included a right to
rece
ve the
"
.. 144
receive information. The court turned first to a 1943 case,
Martin v. City of Struthers,"' in which a Jehovah's Witness
urged the repeal of an ordinance prohibiting the distribution of
religious leaflets. The Martin Court held that the statute in
question violated the appellant's First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights, observing that the Framers "knew that
novel and unconventional ideas might disturb the complacent,
but they chose to encourage a freedom which they believed
essential if vigorous enlightenment was ever to triumph over
slothful ignorance. This freedom embraces the right to
distribute literature . . . and necessarily protects the right to
receive it." 46 The Martin Court concluded that "the freedom to
distribute and receive information was 'so clearly vital to the
preservation147 of a free society'.
that it 'must be fully
preserved."
The Kreimer court next cited Lamont v. Postmaster
General,4 1 which struck down a statute requiring certain mail
be held until the addressee was notified and requested
delivery.4 4 The Court in Lamont found the statute an "undue
141

Kreimer, 958 F.2d at 1262 (quoting Kreimer v. Bureau of Police, 765 F.

Supp. 181, 187 (D.N.J. 1991)).
142 Id.
at 1251.
143

Id. at 1259.

'4
See generally Katherine L. Scurria, Government Funding of Public
Libraries: Legislative, Administrative and Judicial Perspectives 68-71 (July 10, 1997)
(unpublished manuscript for Libraries for the Future, on file with author).
145 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
146Id. at 143 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis
added), cited in Kreimer,

958 F.2d at 1251.
141Kreimer, 958 F.2d at 1251 (citing Martin, 319 U.S. at 146-47).
148 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
149 See Scurria, supra note
144, at 69.
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burden on the flow of ideas to the public" 150 that "stifled the
'uninhibited, robust and wide-open' debate and discussion that
are contemplated by the First Amendment."15 ' The Kreimer
court characterized Justice Brennan's "oft-quoted remark in
Lamont"5 ' as "the hallmark of the right to receive information:
'[t]he dissemination of ideas can accomplish nothing if
otherwise willing addressees are not free to receive and
consider them .... It would be a barren marketplace of ideas
that had only sellers and no buyers.""5 3
Further explaining the First Amendment's guarantee of
the people's right to receive information, the Kreimer court
turned to Griswold v. Connecticut,"' which recognized that the
First Amendment "guarantees, . . . the 'penumbral' right to
receive information to ensure its fullest exercise."5
The
Kreimer opinion then offered the observation from Stanley v.
Georgia,' summarizing the foregoing precedent, that "[ilt is
now well established that the Constitution protects the right to
receive information and ideas."'57
The Kreimer court finally addressed the case of Board of
Education v. Pico,5 ' in which the Supreme Court first
confronted the right to receive information within the library
context, albeit within a school library. In Pico, the Supreme
Court rejected as unconstitutional the Board of Education's
decision to order the removal from the high school and junior
high school library of certain books the school board considered
"anti-American, anti-Christian, and anti-Sem[iltic, and just
plain filthy." 9 In a fractious decision that included seven
separate opinions, the Pico plurality recognized that the First
Amendment protects more than the right to self-expression; it
also guarantees "public access to discussion, debate, and the
dissemination of information and ideas." 60 Even the Pico
150

Kreimer, 958 F.2d at 1252 (interpreting Lamont, 381 U.S. at 307).

151381 U.S. at 307 (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
270

(1964)).
152

958 F.2d at 1252.

13

Id. (quoting Lamont, 381 U.S. at 308 (Brennan, J., concurring)).

154381

U.S. 479 (1965).

155958 F.2d at 1252 (citing Lamont, 381 U.S. 483).
15

394 U.S. 557 (1968).

157Id. at 564, cited in Kreimer, 958 F.2d at
1252.
158457 U.S. 853 (1982).

Id.

at 857. See Scurria, supra note 144, at 70-71; Adam Horowitz, The
Constitutionality of the Children's Internet ProtectionAct, 13 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 425,
439-40 (2000).
160Kreimer, 958 F.2d at 1254 (quoting Pico, 457 U.S. at 866 (internal
citations
159
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dissenters "made no contention that the First Amendment did
not encompass the right to receive information and ideas."16 '
Instead the dissenters argued that, given the educational
purpose of a school as opposed to a public library, the school
board should be granted greater deference in decision making
Justice Rehnquist specifically
concerning collections.16 '
contrasted the educative function of school libraries with that
of public 63 libraries, which were "designed for freewheeling
inquiry."'
After concluding that the First Amendment "does not
merely prohibit the government from enacting laws that censor
information, but additionally encompasses the positive right of
public access to information and ideas,"'6 4 the Kreimer court
went on to acknowledge that this right "includes the right to
some level of access to a public library, the quintessential locus
of the receipt of information."'' Having acknowledged that the
First Amendment includes some right to information access in
the public library setting, the Kreimer court noted that the
"next step is to identify the nature of the forum, ' since the
extent to which the government may regulate access to
information depends upon whether the forum is public or
nonpublic.'67
In assessing the impact of the First Amendment on
government's power to regulate communications, the Supreme
Court has developed three types of government fora: traditional
public, limited public and non-public. 168 As the Kreimer court
observed, traditional public fora include public spaces which
"have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public
...for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between
citizens, and discussing public questions.' 6 9 The government's
activity in these
right to limit First Amendment
"quintessential" public spaces-exemplified by parks and

omitted)).
161

Id. at 1254.

162

See generally Bell, supra note 21, at 215-16.

16

Kreimer, 958 F.2d at 1255 (quoting Pico, 457 U.S. at 915 (Rehnquist, J.,

dissenting)).
164

id.

165Id.
'6 Id. (citing Cornelius v. NAACP, 473 U.S. 788, 797 (1985)).
167 Id.

'6 Bell, supra note 21, at 200; see also Santiago, supra note 8, at 267-70.
169 Kreimer, 958

F.2d at 1255 (internal citations omitted).
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public sidewalks-is "sharply circumscribed" 7 ' and permissible
only where "necessary to serve a compelling state interest and
•.. narrowly drawn to achieve that end." ' '
The second class of government fora, termed limited or
designated public fora, consists of "public property which the
state has opened for use by the public as a place for expressive
activity." 17 2 While the government is not required to open these
spaces to the public for First Amendment purposes, "once it
does so, the government is bound by the same limitations as
exist in the traditional public forum context."' 1 3 A limited public
forum would be created if, for example, the government chose
to provide free advertising space on the sides of public buses. If
it did so, the government could not permit advertisements for
Republican issues, while denying advertising space for
Democratic concerns.
The last type of government forum, the non-public
forum, is a space that is not traditionally open for public
communication,'74 like a military base. In a non-public forum,
the government's power to regulate speech is at its greatest.'
According to the analysis applied in Kreimer, "the
Library constitutes a limited public forum, a type of designated
public fora."'76 The Kreimer decision concluded that "as a
limited public forum, the Library is obligated ... to permit the
public to exercise rights that are consistent with the nature of
the Library and consistent with the government's intent in
designating the Library as a public forum."'7 7 Accordingly,
while it would be acceptable for a Library to forbid certain
types of patron conduct' 78-giving impassioned speeches in the
silent reading room, for example-enforcing viewpoint
discrimination would not be acceptable. Once the library used
government funds to create a forum for free information access,
the government could not then limit what information was
exchanged based on its disfavor for the views expressed.

170 Id. (internal citations omitted).
171Id. (internal citations omitted).
172

Id. (internal citations omitted); see also Bell, supra note 21, at 202-03.

Kreimer, 958 F.2d at 1255 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 1256 (internal citations omitted).
"5 Id. (internal citations omitted); see also Bell, supra note 21, at 203.
,76 Kreimer, 958 F.2d at 1259; see also Bell, supra note 21, at 218-26.
171

177
178

Kreimer, 958 F.2d at 1262.
Id. at 1262-63.
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iii. The Constitutionality of Library Internet Filters:
Mainstream Loudoun "'
In addressing the question of "whether a public library
may, without violating the First Amendment, enforce contentbased restrictions on access to Internet speech[,] " 18° the
Mainstream Loudoun court examined, in a case of first
impression, the relevance of the First Amendment's Free
Speech Clause to public libraries' content-based restrictions on
Internet access. The case arose after the trustees of the
Loudoun County Public Library adopted a policy that required
library staff to install Internet filtering software on all the
library's computers. 8 ' The ACLU, joined by the People for the
American Way, filed suit against the library on behalf of
community residents and Internet providers who claimed the
library's policy denied them access to constitutionally protected
material and violated their First Amendment rights."'
Extending the Kreimer court's judgment that the public
library is a designated or limited forum, Judge Leonnie M.
Brinkema of the Eastern District of Virginia concluded in
Mainstream Loudoun that a public library "need not offer
Internet access, but, having chosen to provide it, must operate
the service within the confines of the First Amendment." 183 As
with other types of communications, the government was under
no affirmative duty to permit or provide Internet access, but
once it did so, it could enforce content-based restrictions on the
communications only by satisfying strict scrutiny."
Judge
Brinkema, a former librarian,"8 ' concluded that "[w]hile the
179 The Mainstream Loudoun case consists of two separate rulings,
made on
motions to dismiss and for summary judgment. Judge Brinkema authored her final
decision (Mainstream Loudoun II) on November 23, 1998. In an earlier ruling, issued
on April 7, 1998 (Mainstream Loudoun I), Judge Brinkema recognized the plaintiffs'
First Amendment claims, and resolved issues of standing and immunity. See also Peltz,
supra note 1, at 450.
" Mainstream Loudoun v. Bd. of Trs. (Mainstream Loudoun I), 2 F. Supp. 2d
783, 792 (E.D. Va. 1998).
181Id. at 787. The library trustees justified their decision to install filtering
software both in order to "block material deemed Harmful to Juveniles" as well as to
avoid any sexual harassment liability to librarians or other library employees for
allowing the development of a hostile working environment. Id. According to the policy,
"Library pornography can create a sexually hostile environment for patrons or staff."
Warren, supra note 14, at 54.
112Warren, supra note 14, at 54.
1 MainstreamLoudoun 1, 2 F. Supp. 2d at
796.
" Id. at 795.
1
Horowitz, supra note 159, at 442.
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nature of the public library would clearly not be compatible
with many forms of expressive activity, such as giving speeches
or holding rallies, we find that it is compatible with the
expressive activity at issue here, the receipt and
communication of information through the Internet.""6 If the
government chose to provide Internet access within the public
library setting, then it could not "selectively restrict certain
categories of Internet speech because it disfavors their
content."8 7
Judge Brinkema compared the library's decision to limit
access to certain Internet sites with the school board's decision
in Pico to remove certain books from the school libraries.1 88
Explaining that by "purchasing Internet access, each Loudoun
library has made all Internet publications instantly accessible
to its patrons," 89 Brinkema rejected the assertion that offering
access to some Internet sites and not others was analogous to a
library's traditional decisions regarding collection development,
to purchase some books but not others. Unlike those latter
decisions, which required choices involving the use of limited
funds, extending Internet access to filtered sites did not require
expenditure of additional resources. 90 In fact, once the library
provided Internet access, it actually required additional
resources to limit the sites available. As a result, Judge
Brinkema concluded that Internet filtering could be described
by the "analogy of a collection of encyclopedias from which [the
library has] laboriously redacted portions deemed unfit for
library patrons. As such, the Library Board's action [was]
appropriately characterized as a removal decision." 9 ' While the
18 Mainstream Loudoun 11, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 563.
197
199

Mainstream Loudoun I, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 795-96.
Id. at 793. See also Nowak, supra note 87, at 349-51; Semitsu, supra note

37, at 527.

Mainstream Loudoun 1, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 793.
Id.
191Id. at 793-94. Judge Brinkema's determination that a library's use of
189
190

blocking software is analogous to a library removing books from its shelves has not
been without critics. See, e.g., Mark S. Nadel, The First Amendment's Limitations on
the Use of Internet Filtering in Public and School Libraries: What Content Can
LibrariansExclude?, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1117, 1119 (2000) (suggesting that "[c]ontrary to

the rationale used in the Loudoun decision, there is no constitutionally significant
difference between the library's discretion to manage its bookshelves and the discretion
to manage its Internet access terminals"). Judge Brinkema, however, directly
addressed the contention of critics like Nadel by explaining that the decision to block or
filter information from Internet sites is more akin to removing books from library
shelves than to purchasing materials selectively. See also Peltz, supra note 1, at 46064, 470-75 (critiquing Nadel's thesis, arguing that the reasoning by the Mainstream
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Library Board's decision to restrict access to certain
information was analogous to the School Board's decision to
remove school library books in Pico, the analyses were not
identical. Unlike the school libraries in Pico, the public
libraries at issue in Mainstream Loudoun "lack[ed] the
inculcative mission that is the guiding purpose of public ...
schools"'92 and school libraries.
Describing public libraries as "places of freewheeling
and independent inquiry"'93 and characterizing the decision to
bar access to certain Internet sites as a restriction on
unfavored speech, Judge Brinkema applied the strict scrutiny
required to assess a content-based regulation of speech in a
limited public forum. The court evaluated the plaintiffs' claims
by examining whether the board narrowly drafted the
regulation in question to advance a compelling governmental
interest. 94
While acknowledging that the government had a
compelling interest in protecting children from harmful
communications, 9 ' Judge Brinkema concluded that the use of
Internet filters was not the least restrictive means to achieve
this goal,'96 since it required limiting the communications on all
of the library's computers to those which would be acceptable
for children. Evoking the Reno Court's invocation of the
"sandbox" effect, Brinkema wrote, "it is clear that defendants
may not, in the interest of protecting children, limit the speech
available to adults to what is fit for 'juveniles."'197 Thus, the
Mainstream Loudoun decision found the Library Board's policy
mandating the use of Internet filtering software an
unconstitutionally overbroad regulation on speech, much as the
Supreme Court had found the CDA overbroad in Reno v.
ACLU. 198
Loudoun Court was sound, and concluding that "filtering can be properly characterized
only as removal").
12 MainstreamLoudoun 1, 2 F.
Supp. 2d at 795.
193 Id.
194

Id. See also Warren, supra note 14, at 54.

195 MainstreamLoudoun 1, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 796-97.
196

MainstreamLoudoun H, 24 F. Supp 2d at 566. See also Warren, supra note

14, at 55 (emphasizing less restrictive options including: establishing Internet use
policies; setting time limits on usage; educating patrons; allowing adult use of nonfiltered computers; relocating computers; using privacy screens; and enforcing criminal
laws).
9, MainstreamLoudoun 1, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 797.
198 Judge
Brinkema's decision finding the mandatory filtering policy
unconstitutional was soundly rejected by the child protection advocates who support
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The Supreme Court's jurisprudence on the First
Amendment rights to send and receive information, together
with the Kreimer and Mainstream Loudoun decisions
emphasizing that libraries providing Internet access are
designated public fora created for the exchange of ideas and
information, provide the backdrop against which courts must
assess any federally mandated library filtering legislation. All
these principles were implicated when a group of plaintiffs
including the ALA and the ACLU brought a challenge in the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania199 against Congress' most
200
recent attempt to protect children from Internet harm, CIPA.
CIPA explicitly conditions the receipt of federal funding on the
use of Internet filters in public libraries, and determinations of
its constitutionality will pave the way for future childprotection legislation and policies.
C.

The Constitutionalityof CIPA's Library Provisions

Designed to protect children "in those places where we
want to believe they are most secure," CIPA requires schools
and libraries to use filtering technology if they accept federal
subsidies to connect to the Internet. 20 ' The legislation is more
filters. Linda Chavez, President of the Center for Equal Opportunity, renounced the
decision as a
baseless and dangerous decision .... Judge Brinkema's decision goes far
beyond any reasonable interpretation of the "free speech" clause of the First
Amendment and sets dangerous legal precedent that left unchallenged will
debase the political freedoms of citizens in a democracy to enact sensible
policies designed both to protect children and uphold community standards of
decency and decorum in public places.
FilteringSoftware Debate Continues, supra note 48.
199 Am.

2002).

Library Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401 (E.D. Pa.

.0047 U.S.C. § 254(h) (2002).
201 Supporters of Internet Filtering in Schools and Libraries Back Franks-

McCain Bill, TECH L.J., (1999), at http://www.techlawjournal.com/censor/19990303.htm (last visited Jan. 17, 2003). The Children's Internet Protection Act is actually a
somewhat misleading name, in that the label functions as a general shorthand which
actually encompasses two separate acts passed by the 106th Congress. American
Library Association, Questions and Answers on Children's Internet Protection

Legislation, available at http://www.ala.org/cipa/q&a.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2002)
(explaining that Congress combined three distinct bills, originally sponsored by
Senators McCain and Santorum and Representative Istook, into the "Children's
Internet Protection Act" and the "Neighborhood Children's Internet Protection Act,"
provisions of which have subsequently been described under the general label of
"CIPA."). The two pieces of legislation inserted similar language into three statutes:
The Elementary and Secondary Education Act ("ESEA"); subtitle B of the Museum and
Library Services Act, known as the Library Services and Technology Act ("LSTA"); and
the section of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended by the Telecommunications
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restrained than the CDA and COPA in its response to the
perils of Internet harm. CIPA's approach to protecting children
centers on ensuring that they are denied access to offensive
content, focusing on children as the recipients of
communications, rather than on the initial transmission of
such communication. Instead of authorizing criminal or civil
penalties for transmitting harmful content on the Internet as a
whole, CIPA only prohibits the spending of federal funds on
computers that are operated with unfiltered access to the
Internet or on Internet service in the school or library setting.2
CIPA requires the blocking of Internet materials
containing visual depictions of child pornography or material
that is obscene or harmful to minors."' It requires schools and
libraries to institute Internet safety policies that include
technology protection measures 20 4 to be eligible to receive
discounted Internet access or to receive federal funds to
purchase computers or access to the Internet."5 CIPA
conditions the receipt of federal funding on a school's or a
library's decision to install Internet filtering software on all of
its
.
206
its computers.

Act of 1996, extending universal services to schools and libraries in the form of
telecommunications discounts ("E-rate"). Id. For the sake of simplicity, this Note refers
to the various modifications of the ESEA, LSTA and E-rate statutes under the
umbrella term "CIPA."
212 CIPA's defenders emphasize its narrowly tailored scope,
but critics
vehemently disagree and reject the Act as a sweeping example of censorship. According
to Chris Hansen, Senior Staff Attorney at the ACLU, CIPA represents
the first time since the development of the local, free public library in the
19th century that the federal government has sought to require censorship in
every single town and hamlet in America[.] More than 100 years of local
control of libraries and the strong tradition of allowing adults to decide for
themselves what they want to read is being casually set aside.
Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Promises Legal Challenge as
Congress Adopts Bill Imposing Internet Blocking in Libraries (Dec. 18, 2000), available
at http://archive.aclu.orgnews/2000/nl21800a.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2003).
20 Id. See 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(6)(B)(i).
0447 U.S.C. § 254(h)(6)(
B)(i).
205

Id.

§ 254(h)(6)(A)(i). This aspect of CIPA stems from the section of the

Communications Act of 1934, as amended by the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
granting schools and libraries telecommunications discounts.
2
47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(7)(i) ("The term 'technology protection measure' means
a
specific technology that blocks or filters Internet access to the material covered by" the
Act's prohibition of child pornography and material that is obscene or harmful to
minors.). The legislation mandates the use of filters not just on computers used by
children, but those used by adults as well. See id. § 254(h)(6)(C)(i). CIPA also requires
public notice and hearings regarding the adoption of the Internet use policy and
stipulates the mechanisms for certifying compliance that allow a school or library to
maintain eligibility for federal funds.
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In American Library Ass'n, Inc. v. United States,
("ALA") the District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania examined whether CIPA's mandatory Internet
filtering provisions passed constitutional muster when applied
to Internet-equipped computers in public libraries. A threejudge panel held in May, 2002 that CIPA was facially invalid
under the First Amendment." 7 The court concluded that "[in
view of the severe limitations of filtering technology and the
existence of... less restrictive alternatives... it is not possible
for a public library to comply with CIPA without blocking a
very substantial amount of constitutionally
protected speech, in
20 8
violation of the First Amendment."

Echoing Kreimer and Mainstream Loudoun, the ALA
court reasoned that "when the government provides Internet
access in a public library, it has created a designated public
forum."2 8 Citing Kreimer's conclusion that the library
"represents a 'quintessential locus of the receipt of
information'" 10 and noting that the "right to receive
information is vigorously enforced in the context of a public
library,"211 the ALA court explained that:
[bly providing its patrons with Internet access, public libraries
create a forum in which any member of the public may receive
speech from anyone around the world who wishes to disseminate
information over the Internet. Within this "vast democratic forum,"
which facilitates speech that is "as diverse as human thought,"
software filters single out for exclusion particular speech on the
basis of its disfavored content.212

The court further explained that under "public forum doctrine,
where the state creates such a forum ... the state's decision

selectively to exclude certain speech on the basis of its content
is subject to strict scrutiny, since such exclusions risk
distorting the marketplace of ideas that the state has
created." 1 ' To satisfy strict scrutiny, the regulation must
207Am. Library Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401 (E.D.
Pa.

2002).
208

Id. at 490.

209

Id. at 457.

210

Id.

at 466 (quoting Kreimer v. Bureau of Police, 958 F.2d 1242, 1255 (3d

Cir. 1992)).

211Id. (quoting Sund v. City of Wichita Falls, 121 F. Supp. 2d 530, 547 (N.D.

Tex. 2000)).
212Am. Library Ass'n, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 2d. at 470 (internal
citations

omitted).
211Id. at 489.
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accomplish a compelling state interest and must use the
214
narrowest available means.
CIPA's proponents defend the Act's content-based
speech restrictions by arguing that its goal of protecting
children from exposure to the harmful material lurking online
clearly responds to a compelling government interest. 1 Indeed,
courts have recognized this sort of child protection as a
compelling objective. Although the Supreme Court has granted
full First Amendment protection to speech that includes
"[s]exual expression which is indecent but not obscene"" when
evaluating the free speech rights of adults, it has treated the
same material differently in the context of children. In Reno v.
ACLU, the Court emphasized that it had "repeatedly
recognized the governmental interest in protecting children
from harmful materials."2 7 Reno's reiteration of the compelling
state interest in protecting children is but one in a long line of
cases establishing the importance of this goal.21 s Indeed, the
ALA court affirmed the government's "interests in preventing
patrons from accessing visual depictions of obscenity, child
pornography, or in the case of minors, material harmful to
minors."2 9
Under a strict scrutiny analysis, however, regardless of
how compelling CIPA's ends are,22 ' it must still utilize the
narrowest possible means of protecting children in order to
214 See Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (holding that

the state may regulate the content of speech if the regulations are the least restrictive
means of achieving a compelling state interest).
215 As John McCain explained, CIPA "allows local communities to decide what
technology they want to use, and what to filter out, so that our children's minds aren't
polluted." John Schwartz, Law Limiting Internet in Libraries Challenged, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 25, 2002, at A18.
116 Reno 1, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997) (quoting Sable,
492 U.S. at 126).
217 Id.
at 875.
218 Sable, 492 U.S. at 126 (recognizing the Government's compelling interest

in protecting children); Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S.
727, 743 (1996) (asserting compelling interest in protecting children from sexually
explicit material); Stanley v. Georgia 394 U.S. 557, 567 (1969) (stressing importance of
state interest in protecting children); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968)
(recognizing importance of governmental interest in protecting children from harmful
materials).
"9 Am. LibraryAss'n, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 2d at 410.
220Besides responding to the compelling interest in protecting
children from
Internet harm, laws like CIPA may address additional government interests. Bell,
supra note 21, at 222-25 (suggesting that such laws could advance the interests in:
protecting library staff from sexual harassment or other offensive exposure; preventing
secondary effects of objectionable Internet content, such as changing the character of
the library; or assisting patrons in "winnowing" voluminous Internet content).
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survive First Amendment scrutiny.221 If the methods it uses are
either under- or over-inclusive, or if there are alternate means
available to protect children that do not restrict speech, courts
should find CIPA unconstitutional. Because CIPA's mandated
Internet safety policies require the use of Internet filtering
software, and because of limitations in presently available
filtering software,222 CIPA uses means of controlling speech
that are both under- and over-inclusive, allowing access to
some information that it purports to restrict, while preventing
speech that is constitutionally protected. As the court found in
ALA, "it is currently impossible, given the Internet's size, rate
of growth, rate of change, and architecture . . . to develop a
filter that neither underblocks nor overblocks a substantial
amount of speech."2 3 CIPA's requirement that public libraries
use these ineffective filters, therefore, is not narrowly tailored
2 24
to further the government's concededly important interest.
To withstand constitutional scrutiny, a content-based
restriction on speech must, at the very least, accomplish the
25
compelling government interest toward which it is directed. If
a measure is under-inclusive, suppressing speech while not
accomplishing the compelling goal, it will not be upheld.2
Perhaps because Congress tailored CIPA more narrowly than
the CDA or COPA, it is under-inclusive and fails to accomplish
its stated goals. First, because the legislation limits the scope
of its prohibitions to visual images that may harm children, it
does not protect youngsters from harmful textual materials.22 7
Children may access indecent, or even obscene, text without
triggering the restrictions of CIPA.2 s Second, harmful Internet
221

See generally Keller, supra note 99, at 605-11 (applying strict scrutiny

requirements of compelling interest and narrow tailoring to proposed legislation
authorizing library Internet filtering).
222 See infra notes 230-50 and accompanying text; see also Expert Report of
Benjamin Edelman, Am. Library Ass'n, Inc. v. U.S., 201 F. Supp. 2d 401 (E.D. Pa.
2002) (No. 01-1332), available at, http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/edelman/pubs/aclu-101501.pdf (last visited Jan. 23, 2003); Kessler & Rapawy, supra note 103.
223 Am. LibraryAss'n, Inc., 201 F. Supp.
2d at 437.
224 Id. at 410.
225 See, e.g., Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1979).
221 See id. at 110 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
227 See Conn, supra note 20, at 488.
228 During the trial assessing CIPA's constitutionality, Edward R. Becker,
Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, expressed surprise while
looking at a filtered "text-only" version of a pornography site. Judge Becker responded,
"But this has extraordinarily graphic text," and asked, "[aire you saying that anybody
can access this text [without triggering CIPA's proscriptions]?" The witness responded
simply, "That's right." Iver Peterson, Access to Pornography on Net is at Center of
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materials transmitted via a medium other than the Web, such
as streaming video or e-mail, may fall into CIPA's categories of
restricted speech. Yet, existing filtering software, which filters
only Web-based content, will not screen this material.229
Some of CIPA's under-inclusiveness stems from
technological difficulties inherent in Internet filtering
software.23 ° Filtering software identifies objectionable sites in a
variety of manners, each of which gives rise to its own
problems. Some software blocks access to lists of sites that
computers or humans have pre-screened and classified in
various categories of offensiveness.2"' Because of the sheer
volume of material on the Internet, and the rapidity with
which new Web pages are added, it is virtually impossible for
any filtering product to screen every Web page.232 Thus, new
pages with objectionable material may slip through filters that
exclude only pre-screened sites.
Other Internet filtering software uses a technology
known as "string-recognition," which may result in overinclusiveness by restricting access to a great deal of material
which does not fall into CIPA's categories of restricted
speech.233 String recognition software employs technology that
searches either Web site URLs or Web pages themselves for
certain sequences of letters that suggest inappropriate
content. 34 Unfortunately, the sophistication of such software is
limited, and it often restricts innocuous, as well as offensive,
speech.235 For example, the software may block a Web site with
LibraryFight, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2002, at A27.
229Edelman Report at 25-37 ("[Bllocking programs systematically fail to
differentially allow access to certain Internet other than that distributed over the Web.
For example, blocking programs are unable to differentially restrict access to images
that meet their category definitions but are transmitted via e-mail, streaming media,
or a variety of interactive systems.").
230See Semitsu, supra note 37, at 513-19; see also Peltz, supra
note 1, at 41016.
231 Edelman Report at 15-20.
232Id. at 27, 33.
23 Nowak, supra note 87,
at 348.
234 Id.
13' The first major study of the effectiveness of filters to appear in a peerreviewed journal suggested that students using computers with filtered Internet access
were blocked from many useful health sites and other sites with references to sex and
sex related terms (e.g., the Journal of the American Medical Association's site for
women's health; and sites with references including "safe sex," "condoms," "abortion,"
"jock itch"). The study supports a view of current filtering technology as a particularly
blunt instrument: filters set at the least restrictive level blocked an average of 1.4% of
health sites, versus 25% when set at the most restrictive level. In contrast, the amount
of pornography blocked was 87% at the least restrictive level, and only 91% at the most
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information on "Mars Exploration" because it includes the
letters s-e-x in order."6 A particularly ironic example of this
overbreadth, given the political forces arrayed in support of
CIPA, is that certain filtering software blocked access to the
Internet home page of former House Majority Leader Richard
"Dick" Armey, a staunch filtering advocate, because his site
contained the word "Dick."237
A significant problem with software filters that search
text for objectionable terms is that such software is generally
unable to analyze images. In ALA, the court recognized that
"[i]mage recognition technology is immature, ineffective, and
unlikely to improve substantially in the near future."23
Because the narrowly drafted provisions of CIPA only concern
"visual depictions," existing filtering software is singularly
ineffective at furthering CIPA's goals.
In addition, by requiring the use of filters on computers
used by adults, and not just those used by children, CIPA
restricts adult speech. Even if it were possible to create a
perfect Internet filter that could block access to certain
materials that are indecent or harmful to children, some of
these materials would be protected as communication among
adults.239 Because CIPA fails to distinguish between those
restrictive level. Schwartz, supra note 1 (summarizing report in the Journal of the
American Medical Association produced by the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation,
entitled "See No Evil: How Internet Filters Affect the Search for Online Health
Information"); see also Press Release, American Library Association, New Study
Confirms Internet Filters Fail to Block Much Pornography, Deny Important Health
Information to Public (Dec. 10, 2002), available at http://www.ala.org/alaorg/oif/kaiserstudy.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2002); Christopher D. Hunter, Filtering the Future?:
Software Filters, Porn, PICS, and the Internet Content Conundrum (1999)
(unpublished M.A. thesis), available at http://www.ala.orglalaorg/oif/hunterthesis.html
(last visited Jan. 17, 2002).
236 Horowitz, supra note 159, at 434. See also Peltz,
supra note 1, at 412-14
(cataloging list of sites inappropriately blocked by filtering software); Linda Campbell,
A Software ProgramToo Far?,FT. WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Apr. 4, 2002, at 11 (stating
that filters have blocked a Super Bowl "XXX" site, passages from St. Augustine's
Confessions and pages of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers); Julien Mailland, Note,
Freedom of Speech, The Internet, and Control: the French Example, 33 N.Y.U. J. INT'L
L. & POL. 1179, n.152 (noting that a gardening Web site with tips on growing
cucumbers could be blocked, since software will detect the letters c-u-i in sequence).
237 Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Promises
Legal
Challenge as Congress Adopts Bill Imposing Internet Blocking in Libraries (Dec. 18,
2000), available at http://www.aclu.org/cyber-liberties.cfm?id=8219&c=59&type=s (last
vistited Oct. 30, 2002).
238 Am. Library Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 431 (E.D.
Pa. 2000). The court noted further that "no presently conceivable technology can make
the judgments necessary to determine whether a visual depiction fits the legal
definitions of obscenity, child pornography, or harmful to minors." Id. at 433.
239 See, e.g., Reno I, 521 U.S. 844, 875
(1997).
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library computers used by children and those used by adults,24
it mandates restrictions on adult communications that, even if
acceptable when relating to children, are unconstitutional
when applied to the context of adult speech.
CIPA's defenders argue that the law does not
unconstitutionally burden adult speech because it includes a
disabling provision that allows a library administrator or other
authority to disable filtering software "to enable access for bona
fide research or other lawful purposes. " "' Even assuming that
this disabling provision would make it possible for a library
patron to access all constitutionally protected Internet content
after requesting that a librarian disable filtering software,242
however, the library patron would still be required to make an
affirmative request for permission before accessing the
disfavored speech. 43 The ALA court found that by requiring
patrons to request permission before accessing Web sites
containing disfavored speech, CIPA created an unconstitutional
burden on speech 44 that would deter library patrons from
receiving constitutionally protected communications.2 45 The
ALA court found this deterrent effect to be a matter of
"common sense as well as amply borne out by the trial
240 47

U.S.C. § 254(h)(6)(C)(i) (1998).
20 U.S.C. § 9134(f)(3). This section, dealing with libraries receiving LSTA
grants, provides for filter disabling for "bona fide research" and presumably would
allow a librarian to disable filters upon the request of either an adult or a minor
performing "bona fide research." In contrast, the corresponding section dealing with
libraries receiving E-rate grants, 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(6)(D), allows for disabling of filters
only "during use by an adult, to enable access for bona fide research or other lawful
purpose." See Am. Library Ass'n, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 2d at 484-85. There is no
explanation for this anomaly in either the statutory text, or in the legislative history.
See American Library Association, Questions and Answers on Children's Internet
Protection Legislation, at http://www.ala.org/cipa/q&a.html#disabled (last visited Jan.
15, 2003).
242 See Am. Library Ass'n, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 2d
at 485-86 (construing
disabling provisions as allowing access to all constitutionally protected material, in
spite of imprecisely drafted provisions).
243 Id.
at 486.
144 Id.
at 486-88. Cf. Conn, supra note 20, at 491-92 (citing Urofsky
v. Gilmore,
167 F.3d 191 (4th Cir. 1999) (attaching no stigma to requirement that faculty members
request disabling of filters to access sexually explicit material on state-owned
computers)). Conn suggests that disabling provisions of CIPA may be constitutional.
Id.
245 Am. Library Ass'n, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 2d at 486-89 (concluding that
"laws
imposing content-based burdens on access to speech are no less offensive to the First
Amendment than laws imposing content-based prohibitions on speech") (citing United
States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 812, 826 (2000); Lamont v.
Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965); Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium,
Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 754 (1996); Fabulous Assocs., Inc. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util.
Comm'n, 896 F.2d 780, 785 (3d Cir. 1990)).
241
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2 6 At the least, it is clear that by requiring librarians to
record."
serve as gatekeepers to whom patrons must identify
themselves before accessing sensitive information on, for
example, health or sexuality, CIPA flies in the face of
librarians' professional dedication to free and anonymous
inquiry. 47
Because CIPA requires public libraries to use Internet
filters, and because all filters significantly over- and underblock, the district court found that the law was not narrowly
tailored.24 The law is also overbroad because it requires filters
on computers used by adults to block content that may be
harmful to minors but is protected speech in the adult context.
Finally, the court concluded that CIPA fails to satisfy strict
scrutiny because less restrictive alternatives are available to
protect library patrons from objectionable Internet material.249
The court suggested a variety of policies relating to the
physical layout of libraries and patron conduct that might
accomplish CIPA's objectives without the impermissible burden
on protected speech.250
In attempting to protect children in schools and
libraries from Internet-based harm, CIPA's sponsors have
responded to the judicial disfavor for measures like the CDA
and COPA by narrowing the focus of the legislation. CIPA
focuses on a narrower range of visual material and seeks to
protect children only in certain public venues, leaving the
protection of children from Internet dangers in the home to
parents. However, as the court in ALA properly found, in spite
of its narrow focus, CIPA, as written, is still unconstitutional.25 '
The law allows access to some material it purports to exclude,
making it under-inclusive and ineffective. CIPA is also
unconstitutionally overbroad in the same sense that the CDA
and COPA are. By restricting protected, innocuous speech
under the guise of controlling harmful and indecent speech,

246

Am. Library Ass'n, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 2d at 487 (noting that plaintiffs

testified that they would have been discouraged from accessing Internet material on
issues including sexual identity and women's health if they had been required to first
ask permission from library staff).
247 American
Library Association, Libraries: An American Value, at
http://www.ala.org/alaorg/oifflib val.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2003) ("We protect each
individual's privacy and confidentiality in the use of library resources and services.").
248 Am. Library Ass'n, Inc., 201
F. Supp. 2d at 410.
249 See infra Part
III.
250 Am. Library Ass'n, Inc., 201 F. Supp.
2d at 410.
251 Id. at 496.
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and by restricting speech between adults to that which is
acceptable for children, CIPA is flawed and causes the
"sandbox" effect.
CIPA represents the federal government's latest
attempt to insulate children from the types of harmful material
that may be found online, but like earlier congressional
attempts, the Act is fundamentally flawed. By relying on the
use of unsophisticated Internet filtering software, the Act
restricts protected speech while failing to restrict all Internet
content that is legitimately dangerous for children. In spite of
the compelling governmental interest in protecting children,
the First Amendment only allows the state to enforce contentbased restrictions on speech when it can prove that the means
used are both actually effective and the narrowest available.
Because the mechanisms embodied in CIPA are simultaneously
overbroad and under-inclusive, the legislation fails this
narrow-tailoring prong of the strict scrutiny test. Just as the
Supreme Court found the CDA unconstitutionally overbroad,
and should find COPA unconstitutional upon reconsideration,
252
the Court should ultimately deem CIPA unconstitutional.
III.

FILTERING

THE
INTERNET
IN
LIBRARIES
FOLLOWING THE FIRST AMENDMENT

WHILE

To date, congressional leaders have been less effective
at passing constitutional legislation that actually protects
children than at promoting themselves as defenders of children
from menacing pornographers. Because Congress failed to
respond to important First Amendment principles in passing
the CDA, COPA and CIPA, all three laws unconstitutionally
burden protected speech. Yet, while it remains likely that
COPA and CIPA will eventually suffer the same fate as the
CDA and ultimately be deemed unconstitutional, it is unlikely
that the public clamor for protecting children from cyberpornographers will abate. It is not unreasonable to expect that,
following the next court case striking down an Internet safety
law, voices in Congress will rise once again to try to shut down
"federally funded peep shows.",,5 Even if civil libertarians and
252 See

Conn, supra note 20, at 492-93; Nowak, supra note 87, at 353-55.

253Press Release, Family Resource Council, Family Groups Raise Awareness

About the Dangers of Pornography (May 2, 2001), availableat http://www.frc.org/get/p01e02.cfm (last visited Jan. 15, 2003). Given that pending litigation has brought the
fates of COPA and CIPA into question, the Family Resource Council has redoubled its
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child advocates find little reason to seek the middle ground,
effective congressional leadership could still lead to productive
compromise legislation. Congress might use a finely tuned, far
narrower 254 and

less

restrictive...

approach

than

those

attempted to date, and could pass legislation that would
constitutionally help protect children in public libraries from
harmful Internet material.
The largest challenge to those who would mandate
Internet filtering in public libraries is that, as they currently
exist, filters cannot effectively distinguish between content that
is harmful to children and content that, while offensive, is
protected for adults. As a result, measures like CIPA, which
call for the use of Internet filters on all library computers, will
be unconstitutionally overbroad. A possible solution to this
problem would be mandating filters on Internet terminals used
by children, while not requiring filters on adult-only
computers. 26"

This

solution

would

cure

the

overbreadth

resulting from filters that restrict adults to material
appropriate for children.257 Its implementation might be
problematic, however, in the many smaller public libraries that
do not have separate, distinct computer facilities for children
and adults, or in small, rural libraries that may have only one
Internet accessible computer for public use.
A possibility for libraries with few computers would be
to require the use of blocking software that could be activated
when children log on to a computer, but deactivated before
efforts to expunge Internet smut from public libraries. It exhorts librarians, and the
politicians who represent them, to take action: "[A]Il of the librarians across the
country who identify with the problem need to take back their libraries. Librarians,
don't be a victim of porn." Id.
254 See Semitsu, supra note 37, at 542-43 (listing more than a dozen Internet
safety policy alternatives that employ more narrow means than current library
filtering legislation).
255 See Goldstein, supra note 66, at 1190-91, 1194 (describing less restrictive
Internet safety policies proposed by congressional committee and concluding that
'when Congress chose a means that is more restrictive of speech than the one
recommended by its own expert commission, it has not attempted to use the least
restrictive means").
256 See generally Keller, supra note 99, at 597-98 (explaining that one early
proposal for Internet filtering, Senator John McCain's proposed "Internet School
Filtering Act," called for "public libraries with one or more Internet-accessible
computers [to] install filtering software on at least one of the computers." By not
requiring the use of Internet filters on computers used by adults-except when a library
has only one computer-this proposal would have avoided some of CIPA's flaws.).
257 Of course, overbreadth problems may remain, since filters may prevent
even minors from accessing many useful sites,.such as those dealing with health topics.
See supra Part II.C.
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adult use.258 Many libraries today already require users to log
on to a computer by entering a password or identification
number, often to ensure that patrons using the computers have
library cards or are residents of the library's specific service
area. The identification numbers distributed to patrons could
be coded with specific information on a patron's age that would
activate the filtering software when a minor logged on to the
computer. 2 9 Adult use of the same computer would trigger no
filtering.
While this age-specific triggering of Internet filtering
would seem to correct the "sandbox" effect flaws of CIPA, on
closer examination it remains a clumsy solution to protecting
children. Because of the technical flaws in presently available
filters, a child using the Internet might inadvertently access
harmful material even if filtering software were activated.26 °
Further, the possibility would remain that a child, accessing
educational material on her filtered Internet computer, might
be exposed to harmful content displayed on an unfiltered
computer used by an adult sitting in close proximity to the
child.261 In addition, because of technical limitations on filtering
software, it is likely that over-filtering would prevent children
from accessing a range of information which in fact is not
obscene or harmful to minors. Thus, even if used only on
children's computers, Internet filters alone remain both underand over-inclusive and ineffective in furthering the compelling
goal of child protection.262
25"Nowak, supra note 87, at 354.
259 See Semitsu, supra note 37, at 543-44
(advocating a solution that allows
parents to specify what levels of Internet access their children should be allowed, and
arguing that parent-imposed filtering, unlike mandatory library-imposed filtering, does
not constitute state action and is therefore not constitutionally suspect); see also
Horowitz, supra note 159, at 442-43 (describing library policy in which parents
prescribe what level of Internet access their child's library card will authorize: filtered,
non-filtered or no access); Goldstein, supra note 66, at 1200 (describing filtering
software that can automatically be suspended, depending on age information
associated with library cards).
260 See Edelman
Report.
26 David Burt, a public librarian from Oregon
and founder of an organization
called "Filtering Facts," conducted a study of 613 libraries and reported on the "highly
disturbing type of incident [involving] adults accessing pornography in full view of
children in libraries." Burt concluded that "[wie need to have filters on every Internet
terminal accessible to children in every public library." Supporters of Internet Filtering
in Schools and Libraries Back Franks-McCain Bill, TECH. L.J. (1999), at
http://www.techlawjournal.com/censor/19990303.htm (last visited Jan. 17, 2003).
262 See Xenakis, supra note 15, at 343-52 (suggesting
technological solution to
dilemma of Internet dangers to children based not on filtering but on creation of new
top-level domains (e.g., .sex or xxx) to create an adult-only Internet "red light
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If legislation mandated that children only be allowed to
access the Internet in discrete, separate "children's areas"
where no unfiltered adult-use computers are found, libraries
with limited numbers of Internet terminals and small libraries
without distinct adult and children's areas would face the
difficult choice of installing filters on all their computers or
offering no Internet access at all.263 Alternatively, such libraries
would have to declare periods of time during which the
computers could be used, separately, by either children or
adults. Such an arrangement would ensure children used only
filtered computers but would decrease the overall time
available for both children and adults to use the Internet, an
undesirable consequence that would limit information access
for all library patrons.
Recognizing the inherent limitations in existing
Internet filtering software, Congress might pass legislation
that protects children from dangerous Internet material by
relying on means other than filtering software. Congress could
mandate that libraries place computers used by children in
high traffic areas of the library, or in close proximity to
librarians, who could personally supervise children. 6 ' While
professional librarians might well prove more reliable than
automatic filtering software in distinguishing harmful from
innocuous material, such a proposal would likely meet with
great resistance within the librarian community. As
professional information specialists, librarians might well
resist serving as "babysitters," constantly looking over the
shoulders of their young patrons. 65 Moreover, such monitoring
is in tension with the professional ethic of anonymity that
librarians honor.266 Furthermore, with libraries across the
country facing fiscal challenges and surviving with limited
staffing, there is little likelihood that public libraries could
spare the staff necessary to effectively monitor the Internet

district").
26

See Semitsu, supra note 37, at 539 (noting that nearly half of libraries with

Internet access have only a single Internet terminal, and thus cannot designate
different adult- and child-use Internet stations).
264 See Nowak, supra note 87, at 354; Horowitz, supra note 159, at 442.
265 See Am. Library Ass'n, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 2d at 426-27 (describing "tap-onthe-shoulder" policy that requires librarians to monitor patron Internet usage and
librarian reluctance to confront patrons viewing inappropriate material with a tap on
the shoulder).
266 See supra note
247.
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usage of their young patrons without a substantial infusion of
additional support.
As the above possibilities suggest, any constitutional
legislation would have to use Internet filtering narrowly,
employing it only on computers that were used by children.
Furthermore, because no currently available filtering software
is foolproof, and because all filters expose users to the risk of
encountering some objectionable material, filters alone cannot
protect children from all Internet dangers. To ensure children
will not be exposed to the harmful material that may slip
through the cracks in filtering software, a viable Internet
safety law would have to use additional means to protect
children. Internet accessible computers used by children would
have to be physically placed such that parents, other patrons or
professional librarians could monitor children's usage patterns,
supplementing the protections provided by filters.267
CONCLUSION

For federal legislation to protect youthful Internet users
in public libraries without violating the First Amendment, it
would have to use filtering software sparingly while mandating
other adjustments in the physical layout or staffing patterns of
public libraries.2 6 Such legislation could be problematic for
those federalists who would leave such decisions to librarians
or local governments. At a minimum, such a law would require
significant additional expenditures by many, if not all,
libraries. Well-equipped libraries with extensive staffing would
be positioned far better than smaller libraries to implement
this type of Internet safety plan, while poorer libraries, unable
to devote the physical or staffing resources required under the
law, would have to choose between offering Internet access in

267 See Santiago, supra note 8, at 278 (suggesting parental supervision of
young Internet users is crucial in any viable Internet monitoring scheme).
268 See John Schwartz, No Easy Fixes Are Seen to Curb Sex-Site Access, N.Y.

TIMES, May 3, 2002, at C6 (citing a 2002 report by the National Research Council,
"Youth, Pornography and the Internet"). The leader of the research project suggested
that the report "will disappoint those who expect a technological 'quick fix' to the
challenge of pornography on the Internet." Id. Because of limitations inherent in
present filtering technology, the report concluded that "[though some might wish
otherwise, no single approach-technical, legal, economic or educational-will be
sufficient. . . . Rather, an effective framework for protecting our children from
inappropriate materials on the Internet will require a balanced composite of all these
elements." Id.
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violation of federal guidelines, or eliminating Internet access
entirely.269
Ultimately, the choice to protect children from online
dangers may be one of dollars and cents. The only types of
federal mandates that can effectively protect children without
violating the Constitution will come with substantial price tags
attached. Members of Congress so eager to look "tough" when it
comes to Internet pornography may find that footing the bill to
do so constitutionally will prevent them from staying "tough"
on spending. The price of free speech, in the context of Internet
dangers in the public library, does not render impossible the
constitutional protection of children. It may, however, make
protecting children expensive. If Congress is willing to make
the significant investment in our nation's libraries necessary to
provide safe access to information for all, those who would
protect children and those who would protect the First
Amendment should all find something to celebrate.

J. Adam Skaggs'

NO The scenario may not be as far fetched as it seems at first glance. The San
Francisco Public Library, in defiance of CIPA, has elected to ban all Internet filtering
software from the library, a decision that could cost the library up to $20,000 in federal
funds. As library supervisor Mark Leno noted, "Internet access that the library
provides is often used by folks from different ethnic communities who may not have
computers in their homes. . . . That's where the free speech issue is especially
significant and unfair." Kim Curtis, San Francisco Bans Internet Filters at Public
Libraries,N. COUNTY TIMES, Oct. 3, 2001, available at http://www.nctimes.comnews/2001/20011003/64547.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2003). While a relatively wealthy city
like San Francisco can afford to keep providing Internet access, even without federal
support, other, less wealthy communities may be unable to do so. ALA's Judith Krug
summarizes the conundrum facing libraries: with CIPA, "Congress has attempted to
force libraries to choose between technology funding and censorship. . . . [CIPA]
requires a terrible choice-and an unconstitutional one." Press Release, American
Library Association, ALA v. U.S. Statement by Judith Krug (Mar. 25, 2002) at
http://www.ala.org/pio/presskits/cipa/statement.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2003).
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